


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SPECIAL REPORT

NASIR'S ARAB POLICY - THE LATEST PHASE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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NASIR'S ARAB POLICY - THE LATEST PHASE

Nasir's major foreign policy goal continues to be Arab unity under the aegis of Egypt. Always a pragmatist, his methods of achieving this goal have varied widely. In recent months he has adopted new tactics which have had considerable initial success and have given Egyptian foreign policy a momentum it has lacked in the past several years. More flexible and less obviously aggressive, this new approach has already greatly reduced much of the bickering endemic in the Arab world, raised Egyptian prestige, and given Nasir's Arab enemies far less room for maneuver.

Background

Since the Syrian breakaway from the constitutional union with Egypt in 1961, Nasir has been searching for some new initiative in Arab affairs that would allow him to utilize fully his personal prestige, Egypt's position as the first of the "liberated" Arab states, and the international political assets of Egypt's large population and relatively powerful military establishment. Nasir's experience with Syria indicated that formal unity, with imposed institutions taking little account of the wide social and cultural differences among the Arabs, was unlikely to succeed for long. Subsequently, he repeatedly stated that the establishment of uniform political and economic systems among the individual Arab states, was a sine qua non for any renewed attempt at Arab unity, but his various attempts since 1961 to do this met with little success. His efforts to shore up the new revolutionary regime in Yemen merely

involved him in protracted military operations, while Egypt remained relatively isolated and distrusted amid the chronic bickering of the various Arab governments.

The fall of the Baath regime in Iraq last November, however, greatly weakened the Baath Party, Nasir's most serious rival for Arab allegiance, and produced for the first time in Iraq--Egypt's traditional opponent among the Arab states--a government willing to work closely with him. At the same time, the imminent fruition of Israel's long-heralded plan to divert the waters of the Jordan River brought the Arab-Israeli problem into new focus. Nasir convened a "summit" conference of Arab leaders in Cairo last January to deal with this new situation. Their decisions have provided the foundation for Nasir's new tactics.

The Arab "Summit" and After

The Israeli project has aroused Arab anger and apprehension

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for years and obviously called for some sort of response. In convening the conference, however, Nasir had in mind obtaining an endorsement of the Egyptian posture of relative moderation and nonaction vis-a-vis Israel. He was fearful that the more aggressive Syrians in particular might take some action that would involve Egypt and the other Arab states in a war for which they were not prepared.

The Arab leaders in Cairo agreed on two long-range lines of action. The first was to build extensive engineering works to divert some of the headwaters of the Jordan River which rise in Arab territory, thus reducing the water flow to Israel. Since these works would be close to Israel's borders and vulnerable to Israeli attack, the summit meeting also agreed to build up, in advance of diversion of the waters, the armed forces of the various Arab states, especially those bordering on Israel: Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. To coordinate and control the Arab armed forces, the conference formed a United Arab Command (UAC) with headquarters in Cairo. Joint Arab commands have been created before, at least on paper. In this instance, however, agreement was reached on generous financing of the new command, largely from the oil revenues of member states.

Initially, Nasir probably viewed these arrangements merely as a tactical maneuver providing

the minimum Arab response to the Israeli water program. The summit decisions, however, quickly aroused real enthusiasm among the Arab states as a first, mutually agreeable, practical step against the Israeli challenge. Nasir soon found that in the UAC--supplemented by the Arab League, in which Egypt has always had the largest voice--he had an unusually effective lever with which to influence the conduct and decisions of the other Arab states. The UAC is dominated by Egypt, whose army has supplied both the commander in chief of the new force and its chief of staff. Tactics and strategy, insofar as they have been developed, appear to be based on Egyptian military doctrine. Decisions of the Egyptian-dominated staff have been virtually binding on other states; military training missions run by the Egyptians have already begun to be formed. This influence over the military posture of the other Arab states leads directly to influence over their related foreign policy decisions.

The summit meeting also ushered in a period of relative "good feeling" among the various Arab states. For years each country has accused its neighbors of doing too little for the Arab Palestinian cause; the agreements in Cairo have taken this issue out of circulation, at least for the moment. The muting of inter-Arab polemics and the pressure to maintain at least a semblance of the unity of purpose achieved at the Cairo

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conference have made it more difficult for other states to resist Egypt's foreign policy initiatives. Nasir has recognized this as a new opportunity to reduce further the Western presence in the Middle East--another of his long-standing objectives. Pressure on the Libyan Government to eliminate the Western bases there has increased during the past several months, while moves to create a common front against the British bases in Aden and Cyprus are also under way.

In working through the UAC and in attempting to create a common Arab foreign policy, Nasir appears willing to cooperate with any of the Arab states--except the Baathist Syrian regime--whatever their form of government or social structure. He is, however, attempting to form a special relationship, short of formal union, with the "liberated" Arab states--Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria. There has been pressure for a faster, closer union from elements in Yemen and Iraq, but on this matter Nasir has moved cautiously. His tactic has been to sign virtually identical "coordination" agreements with Iraq and Yemen, creating joint presidential councils which meet every three months to consider the "planning and coordination of the policy of the two countries in the political, military, economic, social, cultural, and information fields." These agreements probably have little meaning in themselves, but with them Nasir

has in effect shaped a flexible form into which can be poured whatever degree of unity he thinks expedient at any given moment.

In this respect Nasir has apparently concluded that an across-the-board strategy applying equally to all the Arab states is unworkable. He is pragmatically approaching Cairo's relations with each of the Arab states as separate problems with a separate line of action necessary in each case. It is in the context of this new policy that he will deal with the various chiefs of state at the scheduled second Arab summit conference in Alexandria on 5 September.

Relations With Jordan

Nasir's tactic of extending his influence by capitalizing on the Arab summit decisions is receiving its most intensive application in Jordan, and Jordanian responsiveness is in marked contrast to what it would have been a year ago. The summit conference was a turning point in Jordan's relationship to the rest of the Arab world because of the rapprochement which occurred there between King Husayn and Nasir. Jordan's recent recognition of the republican regime in Yemen and the Jordanian decision to attend the second nonaligned conference in Cairo in October are among the effects of this new relationship.

Husayn was the first Arab leader to respond to Nasir's

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call for an Arab summit conference. The King, who considers himself a champion of Arab unity, has long wanted to play a larger role in the effort to achieve it, but has often found himself isolated from the other Arab states and has frequently been attacked by them. Nasir's propaganda blasts and subversive activities, in particular, have posed serious threats. Even before the summit conference, Husayn had been anxious to reduce the danger from Nasir by reaching an accommodation with him. Husayn thus all the more willingly accepted the opportunity afforded by the conference to reassert his Arab patriotism regarding Israel and to line up beside, if not behind, Nasir in the new united military command.

Following a UAC decision to expand Jordan's military force by adding four to six combat brigade groups and a supersonic aircraft squadron, Nasir has urged the Jordanians to buy Soviet arms, including MIG-21s. These assertedly can be obtained by the UAC at reasonable cost through Egypt's good offices. Seventy million dollars has been allocated by the UAC over a ten-year period for the purchase of the equipment needed for this expansion.

The Jordanians, reluctant to antagonize the US and jeopardize US aid by accepting Soviet weapons, replied that better equipment, such as F-104C fighters, was available from the US. They further argued that it would be wiser if West-

ern sources continued to supply Jordanian forces. Husayn accordingly has asked the US to provide the arms, stressing--partly to increase the pressure on the US to meet his request--the problem the UAC offer poses for him. It seems clear that if he fails to get US supersonic aircraft, the most important item on his shopping list, Husayn will feel obliged to accept MIG-21s. The Jordanians say that once they have committed themselves to the expansion of forces with UAC assistance, they would have no room for maneuver. Moreover, the aircraft are available at no initial cost to Jordan.

The subordination to pan-Arab planning of much of Jordan's policy on Israel has inhibited Husayn's freedom of action in other respects. He has refused the US offer to arrange a quiet agreement with Israel to allocate water from the Yarmuk, a tributary of the Jordan River, even though such an agreement would benefit Jordan. The Jordanians explained that Jordan can no longer make a bilateral decision and all matters concerning Jordan River waters would have to be related to the Arab diversion plan.

This international association with Nasir and the UAC may have led Husayn to undermine his position in another way. Responding to pressure for an improved Arab military posture, the King in July ordered the retirement of over 90 army officers, mostly Bedouins, whom

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he considered incompetent. Whatever its justification, the action antagonized Bedouin leaders who have been among his staunchest political supporters. As a result, they and their tribes may be less enthusiastic about backing the King in any future domestic crisis. Pro-Egyptian feeling is believed to be strong among the younger officers who have benefited from the shakeup. Even though Husayn recognized the risks he was running, he had persuaded himself that he could trust Nasir and limit Egyptian influence. Recently, however, the King has again become suspicious of Nasir's intentions.

Lebanon

Lebanon, where certain headwaters of the Jordan River originate, will expand its armed forces, too, in accordance with the summit decisions. Through the UAC, Egypt has also urged the Lebanese to convert to Soviet equipment. Beirut's response has been similar to Jordan's since the Lebanese, traditionally neutral in inter-Arab politics, are equally wary of allowing Nasir any greater influence in their country, which Nasir values as a base for clandestine operations against Syria.

The Lebanese, like the Jordanians, also prefer getting Western arms and equipment, but have said they must acquire new arms under any circumstances. The US has agreed, under certain conditions, to sell Lebanon 16 F-8A supersonic aircraft. The Egyptian offer to serve as a go-between for the purchase of Soviet weapons still stands, however, and may yet give Nasir

added leverage in Lebanon. It is doubtful, however, that the administration of new President Hilu will reconsider the Lebanese decision to purchase from the US.

Iraq

Since the fall of the Baath regime last November, the Egyptian-Iraqi relationship has probably been closer than at any time in the past. Direct, if informal, lines of communication apparently exist between the two countries on the presidential and cabinet levels, as well as in the lower echelons of government. Cooperation and coordination covers a wide range of governmental activities. The two countries exchange intelligence on the activities of the Baath Party in Syria and elsewhere, and are participating in a joint subversive campaign against the Syrian regime. There is probably also a considerable exchange of intelligence information on other subjects.

Much of the impetus toward close cooperation between Iraq and Egypt has its roots in President Arif's continuing fear of a Baathist counter coup or an assassination attempt. On taking power from the Baath last November he recognized the weakness of his new regime, which is composed of disparate elements, and turned to the Baath's greatest enemy--Nasir--for support. This tendency has been strengthened in recent months as the pro-Egyptian faction within the government has grown. This faction has argued that still closer bonds with Egypt are necessary to protect the regime from the dangers posed by the growing restiveness of Iraq's large religious and ethnic minorities.

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As a result, there is a growing similarity between Egyptian and Iraqi institutions and social and political aims, at least as expressed in propaganda. Numerous delegations have been exchanged, and a large number of Egyptian experts are being sent to Iraq to advise on government projects. The Iraqi Government has set up an Arab Socialist Union "for the Iraqi Region" modeled on Nasir's political organization of the same name. Recent decrees nationalizing Iraqi banks and a wide range of industries have been designed to align Iraq's economy with that of Egypt, and Arif and Nasir have signed a cooperation agreement which has been hailed as a first step toward eventual union between the two countries.

It is unlikely that Nasir wishes to go much further at present. Many moves already taken in Iraq have been pressed by the pro-Egyptian faction, which appears to be attempting to use Egyptian support to strengthen its hand against domestic opponents. The latter, although weakened, still retain considerable strength, and Nasir is aware that too much pressure may generate a reaction which could bring down the present regime.

Nasir has achieved alignment in Iraq, rather than union, and he probably sees this relationship as the pattern for similar arrangements throughout the Arab world. He can count on Iraqi support in the councils of the Arab League and the UAC, and indeed in the UN and other bodies not exclusively concerned with Arab affairs. Iraq has sponsored a number of essentially Egyptian proposals in Arab

councils and has, at Egyptian invitation, chaired a number of conferences in the place of Egypt. Nasir no doubt finds such maneuvers useful, since Egyptian proposals need not appear purely Egyptian in origin. Nasir has also allowed Iraq to take the lead in propaganda attacks against the Baathist regime in Syria, thereby protecting himself against charges that he is disturbing the atmosphere of rapprochement created by the January summit conference.

Iraq's participation in the UAC has had less obvious effect than in the case of Jordan. The Iraqi military establishment has already been largely modernized with Soviet equipment, and a new arms deal with the Soviet Union has just been concluded, independent of the UAC. A very large number of military missions however, have moved between Egypt and Iraq since January, and Iraqi troops are receiving special training in Egypt. These moves are likely to increase Nasir's influence and prestige within the Iraqi Army.

Yemen

The Egyptian relationship to Yemen is a special one: The Yemeni republican regime is little more than a client state of the Egyptians. The funds necessary for running the Yemeni Government are supplied by Egypt; Egyptian "advisers" are found in virtually every Yemeni Government office; Yemeni officials are appointed with Egyptian approval. Above all, the presence of 42,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen precludes the development of a genuinely independent Yemeni Government.

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This state of affairs is not satisfactory either to the Yemeni republicans, who increasingly resent the overbearing Egyptian presence in the country, or to Nasir, who recognizes that the continuing Yemeni war is a drain on his resources and a disquieting spectacle of Arabs fighting Arabs. The republicans, however, cannot afford to stop Egyptian aid as long as the war is in progress, and Nasir, because of prestige and philosophical conviction, will not withdraw his forces as long as he feels the republican regime may founder. His present tactic is to claim that the campaign against the royalists has been virtually won, thereby minimizing the importance of the Yemeni conflict.

A few important Yemenis, in particular President Sallal, have viewed unification with Egypt as a way out of Yemen's many military and administrative problems. These very problems have caused Nasir to react cautiously to such overtures. He apparently is not interested in formal union with Yemen, and, if the military situation improves sufficiently, would probably considerably reduce the Egyptian presence there. Therefore, he has signed merely a coordination agreement with Yemen, similar to that with Iraq.

The actual relation between the two countries is far closer than that implied by the agreement. Nonetheless, the document is important to Nasir as a symbol that Yemen stands among the "liberated" Arab states.

The agreement also provides a framework within which the present close political and economic cooperation between the two countries could be continued even after most of the Egyptian forces have left.

Nasir at present can count on Yemeni support for any of his initiatives in Arab affairs. Yemeni prestige is not very high, but the extra vote provided Nasir in Arab League and UAC councils still counts. Moreover, any future "liberated" republican government, while no doubt more independent of Egypt than the present client regime, would continue to follow Nasir's initiative in Arab affairs.

Saudi Arabia

Despite sharp and continuing differences between Nasir and Saudi Arabia, especially over Yemen whose royalists receive Saudi support, Crown Prince Faysal finds himself in the same dilemma as other Arab rulers. Since the January summit decisions were taken in the context of opposition to Israel, he has little choice but to conform, on the surface at least, to the "era of good feelings." The radio and propaganda war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia has ended, and diplomatic relations have been resumed. In addition, Faysal has agreed to supply \$8.4 million for the UAC, and further assessments no doubt will be made. A few low-level UAC military missions have investigated Saudi military requirements and organization, although little has been accomplished.

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These gestures have in no way lessened Faysal's dislike and distrust of Nasir, nor have they ended Saudi support for the royalists. They have, however, limited Faysal's room for maneuver, and have made it unnecessary for Nasir to parry propaganda attacks from Saudi Arabia. Faysal is planning to attend the 5 September summit conference in Alexandria, where the subject of Yemen will no doubt be discussed by the two leaders. Faysal is unlikely to be especially cooperative in these discussions, but at the same time he will find it difficult to remain intransigent in the atmosphere of cooperation and good will likely to prevail.

South Arabian Federation

In dealing with the British-sponsored South Arabian Federation, Nasir is confronting not an independent Arab state but a Western-controlled Arab area. He does not have to preserve a facade of amity and unity with another Arab government. Nasir is conducting a full-fledged offensive against the British position in the Federation.

The atmosphere of rapprochement among the Arab states since the January summit meeting has made this offensive easier for Nasir. He does not have to defend himself from attacks by Arab enemies, and states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia with strong ties to the West find it virtually impossible to oppose him publicly, because of the popularity of any assault on the British.

Nasir's attack on the British position in the Arab south is in keeping with his over-all conviction

that true Arab unity and the final destruction of the traditional Arab oligarchy is impossible until the last traces of European colonialism have been removed. He is further convinced that Israel's existence in effect, is guaranteed by the West. By undermining Western base areas, such as Aden, and reducing the West's power to react quickly to changes in the area, Nasir feels he is broadening his room for maneuver, not only in regard to Israel, but also in respect to his ability to work against any Arab regime that he might feel was out of step with him. In an area such as the Arab south, where removal of Western presence is certain to leave a vacuum, Nasir is clearly working and planning to fall heir to British power.

Nasir's decision to put pressure on the British in the Federation, evidently taken shortly after the January summit conference, also stems from his conviction, partly justified, that British aid to the Yemeni royalists is preventing the Yemeni republican government from consolidating its position. He is, moreover, in a good position to apply pressure since British rule in the Arab south has become increasingly unpopular and there is considerable Arab nationalist sentiment with which to work. He is conducting a two-pronged offensive, maintaining a constant propaganda barrage against the British, and arming and training dissidents from the federation for sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla activity against the Federation authorities. This has had the extra dividend of diverting attention from the Egyptian campaign against the royalists in Yemen.

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The January summit apparently ended Libya's relative detachment from the mainstream of Arab affairs. Nasir is likely to use his popularity with the Libyans to draw this neighboring country more closely into the Egyptian orbit. Riots in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica last January were triggered by demonstrations supporting the summit meeting in Cairo and clearly revealed to the traditional Libyan ruling elements how much popular support for Arab League causes could be mobilized.

Nasir evidently had this asset in mind last February when he attacked the Libyan Government for tolerating Western bases on its territory. The Libyan Government, unable to offend popular attitudes at home by deviating from the Arab "anti-imperialist" front, has been pressing Britain and the US to agree in principle on evacuation of the bases. Libya threatened more drastic action if this aim is not realized.

The Libyan leaders distrust and fear Nasir but they probably cannot avoid involving Libya more directly in Arab causes and following a foreign policy more closely aligned to that of Egypt. Nasir has been relatively quiet on the base issue recently, but he can still regulate the pressure on Libya at will.

Libya has supplied some of the initial funds required by the UAC for arms acquisition, and Nasir is likely to consider Libya's

growing oil wealth a fertile source for additional funds as they are required. Libya has offered a token force to the UAC but has not yet been called on to supply these troops.

Algeria

Egyptian relations with Algeria are far closer than with any of the other North African states. Nasir regards Algeria as "liberated," and has gone to considerable lengths to promote the thesis that the Algerian revolution is following a course parallel to that of the earlier Egyptian revolution. Nasir's statement, when signing the coordination agreement with Yemen, that "there is now common action between the UAR, Iraq, Yemen and Algeria" was apparently designed to suggest that a similar agreement with Algeria was in the offing. Rumors to this effect have been current in Cairo for some time.

There is no firm indication that such a step is imminent, however. Ben Bella's ties to Nasir predate Algerian independence, but the Algerian leader is preoccupied with domestic problems and seems unwilling to interest himself greatly in such eastern Arab questions as the Israeli issue. Algerian foreign policy is oriented toward more general international issues, rather than purely parochial Arab problems, although Ben Bella gives lip service to the usual Arab causes.

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On the governmental level this stance appears to satisfy Nasir. He would like to reduce Ben Bella's close connections with Cuba and the Soviet bloc, however, and he continues to stress similarities between the social and economic aims and ideals of the two "nonaligned" countries. A communiqué issued after a recent visit by members of the UAR Arab Socialist Union to Algeria emphasized the identity of aims of the union and of Ben Bella's FLN, and closely paralleled a similar communiqué issued by the Iraqi and Egyptian socialist unions. Nasir evidently hopes to draw Algeria further into the orbit of Arab League interests by stressing such parallels. He also presumably hopes to emphasize that the "liberated" states represent the wave of the future in Arab affairs by tacitly assuming an identity of interests and aims between Egypt and Algeria--whose long battle against the French captured the Arab imagination.

Algeria has not been greatly involved in UAC activities. There is, however, considerable cooperation between the Egyptian and Algerian military. Most of the Egyptian officers sent to Algeria in connection with Algeria's dispute with Morocco in 1963 have been withdrawn, but Nasir is continuing to supply Ben Bella with military equipment and ammunition.

Tunisia and Morocco

Nasir has paid relatively little attention to Tunisia

and Morocco in the current phase of his Arab foreign policy. While concentrating on states closer to home he seems content that these two countries give lip service to the causes espoused by the Arab League. Both states have had serious differences with Nasir in the past, but now apparently feel obliged not to disturb the atmosphere of Arab rapprochement. In the past few months Bourguiba's Tunisia, in particular, has supported popular Arab causes and condemned Israel much more loudly. This "Arabization" of Tunisian policy probably does not run very deep, but again obviates the need for Nasir to parry attacks from this quarter. Bourguiba has not yet been asked to supply the token force he offered to the UAC.

Kuwait and the Persian Gulf

Kuwait has for some time been moving away from a position wholly dependent on Britain and aligning itself more closely with popular Arab causes. The present Kuwaiti policy is, in effect, to use its great oil wealth to buy the support of other Arab states for its continued independence. Nasir has encouraged this trend, and has himself received from Kuwait an unsecured loan of nearly \$100 million plus money for deepening the Suez Canal. Kuwait is also supplying the largest share of the initial funds for the UAC and is likely to be called upon to supply additional large sums in the future. Nasir is now paying little attention to the British-protected principalities south of Kuwait.

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Sudan, whose military leaders both dislike and distrust the Egyptians, is also receiving relatively little attention from Nasir. His present limited objective appears to be to encourage Sudan to follow the Egyptian lead on Arab League matters. Nasir is, however, attempting to build his influence among Arab-nationalist - minded junior officers in the army. Egyptian intelligence has been encouraging this group to organize for an eventual takeover, but this appears to be a low-key, long-range project.

Syria

Nasir's attitude toward Syria is strikingly different from that toward any of the other Arab states. He still resents the Syrian breakaway from the union with Egypt, and the overthrow of the Baathist regime in Damascus is a cardinal Egyptian objective. Nasir has encouraged the widespread pro-Nasirist sentiment in Syria and has mounted a full-fledged subversive campaign to replace the Baath with some Nasir-oriented substitute, probably along the lines of the present Iraqi regime. He has also organized an exile pro-Nasirist party named, like those in Iraq and Egypt, the Arab Socialist Union.

Since the overthrow of the Baath Party in Iraq last November, the Syrians have become almost completely isolated from the rest of the Arab world.

Nasir has promoted this isolation, and cooperated with the Iraqis in a joint subversive effort to further undermine the Syrian Baath's already precarious position. This is his only serious, presently active, effort at subversion of an Arab state.

Despite these differences the Syrians are being included in the current UAC military build-up and have made some organizational changes in the army at UAC recommendation. UAC commander Ali Ali Amir's recent visit to Syria was marked by coolness on both sides.

Conclusion

Nasir has taken advantage of a favorable set of circumstances to enhance Egyptian influence in the Arab world. The variety of his approaches argues that he is reacting to these circumstances as they appear rather than acting from a carefully worked out blueprint. A general pattern in his Arab foreign policy however, has begun to emerge since the first summit conference in Cairo.

His first aim is to maintain the atmosphere of detente that was initiated at the conference while he works to secure a dominant voice in the military and foreign affairs of the Arab countries through the UAC and the Arab League. He has transformed the Israeli problem from a divisive force among the Arab countries to a relatively solid rallying point with Egypt in the lead. By pre-empting the Israeli issue he has made it

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exceedingly difficult for other Arab states actively to oppose his guidance of Arab affairs. He has thereby in large measure achieved among the Arab states the "unity of ranks" of which he has often spoken.

Within this larger framework he has also helped establish institutions and a social order similar to Egypt's. The rather vague cooperation agreements with Iraq and Yemen appear to be as far as he wishes to go toward formal union with these states. He undoubtedly views the special relationship both as a device that will eventually attract additional countries and as the nucleus of a larger and tighter Arab federation of the future. With his flanks protected by the general atmosphere of good feeling now prevalent, Nasir is also intensifying his drive to remove the remaining vestiges of colonialism in the

Arab world, both as a means of further reducing the Israeli threat and as a necessary prelude to further "liberation" of the political and social structures within the Arab world.

The various aspects of this fairly complex policy have all recently met with success, but Nasir's drive could falter quickly if the "unity of ranks" he has fostered were broken, either through a confrontation with Saudi Arabia over Yemen, through the defection of Jordan from its present policy of cooperation with Egypt, or through the fall of the Iraqi regime. Nasir is not philosophically wedded to this particular method of dealing with the other Arab states. His present policy has, however, already paid greater dividends than any since the period following the Suez crisis in 1956. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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